By: HASSAN FARAZIAN
SUMMARY: This is the second essay – in a complementary four-part series – to the previous Post in an attempt to analyze both the continuing Iran nuclear deal question that has been politically exploited both in various domestic US and international quarters, notably Israel and their strange Bed “allies” such as Saudi Arabia and some other Persian Gulf countries. The paper below was a study on Nuclear Proliferation (N P), the dynamics of its evolution and politico-strategic considerations besieging any country’s decision-making elite that was presented in 1984 . A brief reflection on an overall view of strategic implications underlining nuclear weapon development by discerning, particularly the United States’ rational will eventually follow with the next and last post in this sequel. However, notwithstanding any divergence of view and critique on the content and analysis of this paper , its ultimate contentions seem to have validated the concluding assertion at the time that had stipulated :
“Despite the efforts directed by the western countries and the international bodies toward the curtailment of N.P., it would be only wishful thinking to assume that their efforts, together with international agreements concerning N.P., can be successful — in a nutshell, the “Genie is out of the bottle”. It seems the central problem is that all Western countries have failed to realize the fact that you cannot have the cake and eat it too, i.e. it is impossible to help the developing countries with nuclear energy and technology (known as “nuclear gray marketeering”) and expect that there will not be any spill over into the nuclear weapon area.
There are more scope to N.P., and obviously many of its aspects have been beyond our limit, but hopefully suffice to have appreciated that, because retarding N.P. does not solve the global problems that shall arise from the increasing number of countries who shall join the nuclear club before the end of this century, it is important to face the challenges that are forthcoming, rather than postponing the most crucial dilemma that shall shape up the future international world order during the next decade and a half.”
The next forthcoming Post on the US-Iran relation will aim to connect the dots of the very complex set of factors and elements underlying the above evolving strategic options in the light of Iran nuclear deal and the changing of the guard in Washington. As United States’ allies and opponents are anxiously awaiting to seek their own bearing with the new administration.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 1980s
Strategy, Arms Control and
Prof. Curt Gasteyger I.U. H. E. I.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO GO NUCLEAR OR NOT TO GO NUCLEAR
A. Pressures for Going Nuclear
Strategic Security Considerations and the Cost Factor
Leadership and Prestige
Internal Political and Economic Pressures
B. Some Triggering Events
Foreign Crisis and Inimical Neighbors
Disenchantment with an Alliance’s “Faith”
The Domino Principle
Acceptability of Nuclear Weapons Function
The Numbers Game – Breaking the Monopoly
C. Arguments Against Developing Nuclear Weapons
THE CURRENT STATE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
ANALYSIS OF AND SOLUTIONS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The past two decades have slowly, but with certainty, observed the spread of relevant technology (not only physical but also the actual know-how) for acquiring nuclear weapons by many third world countries. Thus, the potential for obtaining nuclear weapons has reached the stage that before the end of this century the widespread nuclearization of the globe may be imminent.
Consequently, this development will have an undesirable effect on the evolution of the international political and security arena. Hence, making it a top priority on the agenda of the remainder of this decade and the next, to be addressed by the developed, the developing nations and the international bodies responsible for the curtailment of nuclear proliferation, that can only destabilize further both regional and consequently international security problems.
As opposed to the growing tension between the two blocs concerning arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons, another major problem, i.e. nuclear proliferation (NP), is facing the global, international security environment which must be addressed urgently before the end of this decade. Thus, nuclear proliferation and the possible attainment of nuclear weapons especially by the under-developed, Third World countries lacking political stability has been and continues to be the growing concern for world peace and consequently for regional and international stability as viewed by the nuclear-weapon states.
Obviously, it would be beyond the scope of this essay to analyze or even touch upon all the elements surrounding this complex subject matter, i.e. N.P. Therefore, instead, an attempt shall be made to present and discuss the following themes. First, two opposing views, for and against the N.P. will be presented, since it is essential as a cornerstone of our overall analysis of this subject. Then, an overview of the current nuclear proliferation situation and some of the more critical regions and countries on the verge of becoming nuclear will be examined. Finally, an attempt in finding some realistic solutions to deal with the dilemma of a more proliferated nuclear world by the international community will be made.
TO GO NUCLEAR OR NOT TO GO NUCLEAR
A. Pressures for Going Nuclear
For years now the general view has been that N.P. is undesirable to world peace and regional stability. While at the other end of the spectrum, the opponents, in fact, would argue the exact opposite consequences of the N.P., depending on specific case studies. However, the study of N.P. and its future trend based upon the arguments and pressures in its favor must be treated at two levels of fundamental strains and triggering events if a sounder understanding of N.P. is to be gained. Because,
This distinction between underlying pressures and final triggers is a crucial one in social science. For instance, theories of revolution distinguish the underlying tension (e.g. relative income deprivation) from the precipitant (e.g. a strike) which triggers a decisive clash. Without more adequate understanding of the types of events that would precipitate the actual decision, it is difficult to develop necessary projections of possible future proliferation trends.
Hence, some of the underlying fundamental factors for going nuclear will be discussed before attacking several of the more important triggering events, bearing in mind that the elements pointed out below are not meant to be exhaustive.
1. Strategic Security Considerations and the Cost Factor
Any small nation located in a strategically important region of the globe, surrounded by adversaries and the potential threat of attack has much to gain by “going nuclear” despite the strong denunciation by both the super-powers and other major powers who have already joined the “nuclear club”. In fact, the ascendancy of defense over offense has been attained by the nuclear weapons to the point that depending on the geopolitical situation of a nation,
[W]ith the defense of its borders entrusted to forces structured around the firepower of nuclear weapons, any nation not now a nuclear power, and not harbouring ambitions for territorial aggrandizement, could walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to its neighbors, too prickly for predators to swallow.
Thus obtaining nuclear weapons may be viewed as having a long-term deterrent effect, rather than a destabilizing element in the foreign relation of a country.
While, at the same time, the question of cost effectiveness is as true today for the small nations as it has been for the super-powers in achieving deterrence through nuclear strategic forces since the end of W.W.II. In fact,
To this group, nuclear weapons may be perceived as providing “more bang for the cruzerio”, tremendous explosive power for low incremental cost after initial weapon development. Such thinking underlay Eisenhower’s “more bang for the buck” rationale — and could appeal to Israel should the escalating costs of conventional weapons eventually become unmanageable.
However, in confronting a formidable opponent, there are those experts who believe that:
The cost of developing a nuclear force that could seriously disturb the two super-powers is staggering. A nation must be prepared to spend anywhere from $3 to $5 billion annually — and these expenditures would continue for a decade and longer.
As such, it has always been in view of the above thinking that even much earlier, “…The American president objected, given the prohibitive cost of such armaments, France would not be able, by a long way, to reach the Soviet level.” But,
In reply De Gaulle gave him the doctrine of the French deterrent in its simplest and purest form: “You know very well that on the scale of megatons, a few rounds of bombs would destroy any country. For our deterrent to be effective, all we need is enough to kill the enemy once, even if he has the means to kill us ten times over.
Hence, the geopolitical security and the cost factor have remained as two of the most classical interwoven elements, critical in a nation’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
2. Leadership and Prestige
Undeniably, obtaining nuclear weapons is certain to increase a nation’s prestige and leadership in the view of many third world countries, other nations of the world — and consequently, serve as the final psychological requirement in being accepted seriously and acknowledged in the forums of international relations.
Iraq, Syria, and Libya are a good case in point — all of whom see nuclear weapons as the pre-requisite to gaining Arab leadership. Yet, by any of the above countries becoming nuclear, the pressure will be on other Arab and non-Arab nations alike to obtain nuclear weapons not necessarily because of leadership, security etc., but for the reason of prestige.
3. Bureaucratic Factors
The eventual road toward peaceful nuclear projects, i.e. energy development, can imminently lead to the creation of certain well-organized interest group within a country, including “military, scientific or administrative,” favoring nuclear weapons development. Also,
Pressures from organized scientific and economic groups should not be overlooked either. Such groups can gain great organizational momentum, political and economic influence, social prestige, and capability to argue strategic questions. Their ability to influence the character, scope and pace of their countries’ military development in some cases could tip the balance toward acquiring nuclear weapons.
The Argentina’s atomic energy commission announcement of their possession of a uranium enrichment plant just before a change of government is a good case in point. The announcement at that particular time was because,
…the atomic energy agency senses a loss of support and protection for this elaborate project. Perhaps it fears the … government may re-assess the enormous cost, and the risks of introducing the capability to build nuclear weapons into South America. Perhaps the announcement is a challenge by the military regime’s nuclear spokesman to the new government — a challenge that it ought not to let pass.
Thus, the above pressure groups become as critical in the third world countries, e.g. India, Pakistan etc., as they have most certainly been influential in the development of nuclear weapons in the western countries, i.e. U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, and France.
4. Internal Political and Economic Pressures
Historically, the best mean of distracting the public from mounting domestic problems has been to start a war with an adversary (recent examples: Iran-Iraq and Argentina-Britain). Thus, production of nuclear weapons could be used as another alternative — since at a time of low morale it would be a “…turn to dramatic technological breakthroughs or a high-visibility weapon program as a morale building device.” Hence, an element making many third world countries tempted to pursue nuclear weapons projects.
B. Some Triggering Events
1. Foreign Crisis and Inimical Neighbours
This is perhaps the most classical reason for the abrupt decision to go nuclear by any nation. Both Israel and Taiwan, faced with an overwhelming opponent(s) during a real crisis situation concerning the question of their survival as a nation state may turn nuclear without hesitation as the last source of deterrence to warn off their enemy(ies).
2. Disenchantment With an Alliance’s “Faith”
Indisputably, both the French and Chinese decision to acquire nuclear weapons was a combination of the above point, i.e. foreign crisis (France, the Suez Canal, and China their attempt at retaking a few of the smaller Taiwanese islands), and the realities of an alliance (or rather the lack of it) that forced both powers into the immediate development of an independent nuclear program.
Thus, continuous failure of an ally in her commitment(s), such as the United States’ setbacks in Vietnam, Iran and perhaps in Central America, could prove to be the “triggering event” for Japan, South Korea and Israel (not to mention Taiwan since the recognition of China by the U.S.). Hence, growing security problems of nations are no longer satisfied by mere agreements of an alliance or international guarantees and morality as proven by the recent Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran.
3. The Domino Principle
One nation’s “Security Objectives” are another’s “Insecurity” — and that is a reality that historically nations have failed to appreciate concerning any military build-up, imbalances the balance of power. Thus, whilst nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves, nevertheless their introduction is a clear escalation of a military build-up, difficult to be ignored by any adversary.
In view of the above, the introduction of nuclear weapons in a new part of the globe will immediately create a “Triggering Effect” situation. Hence, as a vivid illustration, South East Asia can serve as a good example of how Chinese nuclear explosion within a short period of time led to India’s nuclear weapons program which consequently placed Pakistan on the path of a nuclear explosion which is expected within the next few years.
4. Acceptability of Nuclear Weapons Function
Quite possibly, as eventually in the long term more countries have joined the rank of the nuclear weapons states they may give impetus to N.P. (It is very difficult to project either the stage, i.e. the exact number of countries, or the time frame which could create this triggering effect) — however, for some guidelines, see Figure 1. In other words, it may quite simply become à la mode to have joined the ranks of others. In the words of the Spanish foreign minister, “We have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty … to have our own potential some day. We don’t want to be the last in rank if such must be the tendency in the next years.” As a result, this may be the final stage of global nuclear proliferation as pointed out by the next triggering effect situation.
Particularly, in the event of a successful use of a nuclear weapon by any country during a conflict can immediately transform the image of nuclear weapons from a historically monstrous, totally dangerous agent of inhuman destruction from The Experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into an image of “it is another weapon” mentality. This reasoning can perhaps be better understood in the light of chemical weapons utilized recently by Iraq against Iran despite its illegality as proclaimed by the international law and community.
5. The Numbers Game — Breaking the Monopoly
It is only logical to assume that as a simple law of probability as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, the chances and opportunities of other nations acquiring relevant technologies en route to the development of nuclear weapons will only increase rather than decrease. No longer one or a handful number of countries can create a state of “monopoly-control” to avert others from gaining access to nuclear weapons’ materials. Furthermore, this will make the international bodies responsible for nuclear non-proliferation obsolete and helpless in their ultimate duty, i.e. safe transfer of nuclear technology for energy purposes.
C. Arguments Against Developing Nuclear Weapons
For many years now the United States alongside the other nuclear-weapon states has maintained the position that the spread of unsupervised advanced nuclear technology and enriched “fissionable material” is destabilizing to the world peace. As early as 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara expressed the United States’ view on the acquirement of nuclear weapons by other countries as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility.” However, nearly a decade and a half later, after the 1974 detonation of a nuclear device by India, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger clearly reestablished United States’ policy concerning N.P. as unchanged to this date as being set by his predecessors by maintaining that, in his words:
We see the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war as the centerpiece of our policy. If additional states acquired nuclear weapons, global stability would be endangered and regional conflicts would run the risk of leading to nuclear war, with potentially catastrophic consequences not only for the nations involved but for all major powers.
We view the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and a more stable world order as crucial United States objectives. Yet a world of many nuclear powers would result in heightened political tensions and increased instabilities flowing from fears that nuclear weapons might be used, whether deliberately or through miscalculation.
Of course, the other nuclear states have maintained the same view as evident by the Chinese complaints regarding the Soviets’ refusal to assist their former “ally” in their nuclear program; and the Chinese rejection of the Libyan request for their own nuclear weapon. Yet, their overall view currently seems to vary from their actual practice of sale and transfer of the relevant technologies related to N.P., as will be discussed presently.
THE CURRENT STATE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Given the realities of nuclear proliferation, the future is not very promising. In order to understand the problem, first one must realize the simplicity of constructing a nuclear weapon as estimated by the Office of Technology Assessment Report.
Many nations are capable of designing and constructing nuclear explosives which could be confidently expected, even without nuclear testing, to have predictable and reliable yields up to 10 to 20 kilotons TNT equivalent (using U235, U233, or weapons grade plutonium) or in the kiloton range (using reactor grade plutonium).
A national effort to achieve the above objectives would require a group of perhaps a dozen well trained and very competent persons with experience in several fields of science and engineering. They would need a high explosive field-test facility and the support of a modest, already established, scientific, technical and organizational infrastructure. If the program is properly executed, the objective might be attained approximately two years after the start of the program, at cost of a few tens of millions of dollars. This estimate does not include the time and money to obtain the fissile material or to establish the infrastructure assumed above.
The success or failure of a national effort will depend more on the strengths and weaknesses of the particular personnel involved in the effort that on the specifics of the technological base of the country.
Furthermore, the decade of the 70s proved to have been disastrous in terms of setting the stage for N.P.; ironically, despite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 signed by ninety-nine countries. Thus,
Several things have happened, though, to shake whatever confidence might have existed that the treaty solved the problem.
One was the Indian explosion of a nuclear device in 1974.
Another … the skyrocketing price of oil which, by making nuclear power more economically attractive, is dramatically increasing the number of countries with access to sizeable quantities of nuclear materials.
A 66-nation study group, after two years of looking at the problem, has concluded that as many as 1,000 supposedly “peaceful” nuclear plants may be built around the world by the year 2000 — and that one result will be a dramatic increase in the quantities of nuclear material that might be surreptitiously diverted into atomic weapons.
The danger, of course, is a lot more immediate than the next century.
Also, the Western powers do not hesitate to run over each other to supply a nation with a nuclear reactor because of the lucrative business that it offers, as evident by a confidential U.S. embassy report from Iran: “Mr. Carleton has learned of reports that the Germans and French may each sell two more reactors here — the Japanese are also rumored to have possibilities. Such sales would put us out in the co1d.” And, the recent visit by President Reagan to China and the importance of nuclear reactor(s) sale to that country as apparent by the priority that the subject matter was given during the visit, demonstrate once again the economic significance of such a sale.
Therefore, in view of all the above, five nations need closer observations in the near future. Not only because they seem to be rising higher on the ladder of N.P., but also because their advancement will have a negative and profound effect toward N.P. of other nations. These countries are Argentina, Pakistan, India, China and South Africa.
Argentina is openly pushing toward N.P. which could be achieved within the next two years which could immediately start a triggering effect among other nations of South America, most notably Brazil, and thereby further frustrating the international effort of nuclear nonproliferation in a region that has so far remained clear from N.P. Next, Pakistan is also a country that has raised international anxiety by a recent statement by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan who is known as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, by claiming that,
Pakistan has broken the Western monopoly in the uranium enrichment field. Pakistan now has a team of dedicated and patriotic scientists who have the capability of solving even the most complicated technological problem.
Additionally, to support the “triggering effect” hypothesis in relation to India’s nuclear program, he stated that, “now we have left it far behind as a result of our uranium enrichment.”
The other two countries not mentioned yet, i.e. India and China, also need a closer examination even though it has been some time since they both have joined the nuclear club. China cannot be ignored because she has successfully pursued and tested a missile program, hence, eventually entering the same class as other nuclear weapon states. Wherefore, the pressures from both China and Pakistan, two long-time foes of India, will only agitate and force the Indian policymakers toward a higher level of proliferation. Not to mention Taiwan that will be under extreme strain to overtly follow her own nuclear weapon program.
Lastly, there is very strong evidence after “a one-second burst of light, detected through heavy clouds before dawn by an average satellite 70,000 miles above the earth, … on Sept. 22,” 1979, that South Africa had tested a nuclear explosion. Even though the South African government has vigorously denied any nuclear tests, in 1978,
…the United States and the Soviet Union both independently detected through satellite photography signs that the South Africans may have built a nuclear test structure in the Kalihari Desert.
Finally, one must recognize the real possibility and danger of a terrorist group acquiring A Nuclear Weapon (or the relevant technology for constructing one) through many third world countries lacking proper safeguard of their nuclear materials. Again, in response to the question that whether a non-state adversary (N-SA) could design and construct its own nuclear explosive the Office Of Technology Assessment Report states that:
Given the weapons material and a fraction of a million dollars, a small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. The group would have to include a person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields, and a “Jack-of-all-trades” technician. They would probably not be able to develop an accurate prediction of the yield of their device, and it could be a total failure because of either faulty design or faulty construction. If a member of the group is careless or incompetent, he might suffer serious or fatal injury. However, there is a clear possibility that a clever and competent group could design and construct a device which would produce a significant nuclear yield.
Still, there was a public concern when the media in U.S. (1977) reported the ability of a young Princeton student to produce a design for a nuclear weapon with $2000, thus raising the inevitable question that whether any international effort can really be effective in halting N.P. and its ultimate menace.
ANALYSIS OF AND SOLUTIONS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Naturally, any meaningful analysis of N.P. should begin by defining what is clearly meant by N.P. — perhaps for this reason alone, the western powers have been unable to grasp and deal with the problem of N.P. effectively, thus unable to formulate a fault proof policy for N.P. as evident by a question from Senator Pell of Rhode Island and the response of the Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance during a Senate hearing of 1977:
Does nuclear proliferation, as used in this hearing, mean to you only the proliferation of nuclear weapon? It doesn’t mean proliferation of nuclear energy and technology, except for weaponary. Is that correct?
Mr. Nye, it means nuclear explosives, which are very difficult to distinguish between weapons and nonweapons purposes. I guess the term of art is nuclear explosive devices. But we stand as we did before, prepared to go forward with cooperation for nuclear energy purposes.
Yet, the above will only serve as a,
… simple concept upon which to focus public discussion. But because the definition does not distinguish adequately among the diverse outcomes encompassed by the categorization “going nuclear”, it fails to provide a powerful analytic tool.
Additionally, some analysts believe that:
The spread of nuclear weapon options may … prove in the long run to be as dangerous as the proliferation of actual nuclear weapons.
However, this categorization of N.P., i.e. nuclear weapon options, as it relates to the realities of constructing a fairly reliable nuclear weapon device is very naive. Because the fact that a nation with strong rumor or evidence to have a nuclear weapon device does not need an actual test to prove its reliability. Furthermore, a nation is either in possession of a nuclear weapon device or is not, there is no in-between state of “nuclear option” that can be helpful as a separate analytical tool. If with all due respect (especially to the ladies) an analogy could be excused to demonstrate the point, having a nuclear weapon device is rather like pregnancy: a woman is either pregnant or not, there are no in-betweens. True, she has a choice but her choice when made is almost as good as being pregnant, and she does not need to test it to be proven!
Keeping the above in mind, one should no longer approach the subject matter in an abstract manner and instead should:
- Transform the concept of proliferation into a more precise and analytically useful one;
- Focus attention on new categories of potential proliferators;
- Broaden understanding of the changing balance of pressures for and constraints upon “going nuclear”;
- Facilitate a more comprehensive and policy-oriented analysis of the scope and dynamics of future proliferation;
- Lead to a more explicit and detailed delineation of the likely problems and risks of a more proliferated world; and
- Provide the necessary foundation for systematic policy analysis, designed both to retard future proliferation and, barring that, to manage the problems of living in a more proliferated world.
Because as demonstrated by Figure 1 with much justification, by the end of the 20th century and due to some of the already presented arguments, the world will be moving toward a more proliferated world order — thus, at best, making any realistic nonproliferation policy only a medium range “retardation policy” rather than an absolute long-term halt to nuclear proliferation.
Figure 1. A Projection for the Steady Growth of Future Proliferation
ORBIS, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 521, Summer 1976.
Despite the efforts directed by the western countries and the international bodies toward the curtailment of N.P., it would be only wishful thinking to assume that their efforts, together with international agreements concerning N.P., can be successful. In a nutshell, the “Genie is out of the bottle”. It seems the central problem is that all Western countries have failed to realize the fact that you cannot have the cake and eat it too, i.e. it is impossible to help the developing countries with nuclear energy and technology (known as “nuclear gray marketeering”) and expect that there will not be any spill over into the nuclear weapon area.
There are more scope to N.P., and obviously many of its aspects have been beyond our limit, but hopefully suffice to have appreciated that, because retarding N.P. does not solve the global problems that shall arise from the increasing number of countries who shall join the nuclear club before the end of this century, it is important to face the challenges that are forthcoming, rather than postponing the most crucial dilemma that shall shape up the future international world order during the next decade and a half.
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 See DUNN AND OVERHOLT, “Proliferation research”, ORBIS summer 1976, Vol. 20, No. 2, summer 1976, pp. 495-524.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit.
 By “small” it is not necessarily meant the actual size but also other components, e.g. population. Thus, South Africa can be a very good example of the point at hand.
 From: American Defense Policy, ed. Mark E. Smith III and Claude J. Johns, Jr., 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press). The exact documentation was hampered because of the inability of locating an older edition where the quote has been acquired from.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit. pp. 504-505.
 James R. Schlesinger, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation”, in American Defense Policy, ed. Mark E. Smith III and Claude J. Johns, Jr., 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 151. It should be noted that the dollar figures mentioned in the quote, i.e. $3 and $5 billion are an estimate for the late 60s, and thus today it would be much higher.
 Quoted in, U.S. Congress, Senate, Nonproliferation Issues, hearings before the Subcommittee On Arms Control, International Organizations And Security Agreements Of The Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sessions. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977) p. 2l2.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit. p. 503.
 Ibid., p. 504.
 “A Nuclear Argentina”, Editorial, Washington Post, reprinted in International Herald Tribune, 26 & 27 Nov. 1983, p. 6, cols. 1-2.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit., p. 504.
 Le Monde, February 27, 1976; quoted in, DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit., p. 503.
 The exact documentation could not be located.
 Smith III & Johns, Jr., o.p. cit. — see footnote 3.
 This is probably an error meant to be “than” rather than “that”.
 U.S. Congress, Senate, Nuclear Nonproliferation And Export Controls, hearings before the Subcommittee On Arms Control, Oceans And International Environment Of The Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977) p. 89.
 Ernest Conine, “Is Our Nuclear Worry The Wrong One? Arms Spread Among Small Nations May Be Worse Peril Than Super-power Attack”, Los Angeles Times, 10 Nov. 1979, Part II, p. 7.
 Documents of the Spy Nest: American Interferences In Iran, Vol. 12, No. 2, English Section. (Tehran: The Muslim Students Following The Imam’s Line, n.d.) p. 100.
 “Pakistan Claims Enrichment Capacity”, International Herald Tribune, 10 Feb. l984, Sec. 1, p. 2, col. 7.
 Norman Kempster & Oswald Johnston, “Burst of Light Raised issue of S. Africa Test”, Los Angeles Times, 27 Oct. 1979, Part I, p. 1, col. 1.
 “Signs of S. Africa Nuclear Test Told: U.S. Studies Evidence of Sept. 22 Explosion”, Los Angeles Times, 26 Oct. 1979, Part I, p. 8, col. 5.
 U.S. Cong. Senate Hearings, Nuclear Nonproliferation And Export Controls, o.p. cit. p. 89.
 Ibid., p. 88.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit. p. 498.
 Theodor Winkler, Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Third World: Problems and Perspectives (Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International Studies — PSIS, 1980) p. 4.
 DUNN AND OVERHOLT, o.p. cit. p. 524.
 Except for the projection of Iran and Iraq — Iran because of the 1979 revolution and Iraq due to the Israelis’ 1980 air raid on the Tammuz atomic centre.